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Gault and the "Experimenting 
Society": A Response to Mr. 
Stapleton 
by Lee E. Teitelbaum Lee Teitelbaum is an Associate Professor of Law at the 
State University of New York at Buffalo. He collabo-
rated with Mr. Stapleton on a manuscript tentatively 
entitled "In Defense of Youth: A Study of the Role of 
Counsel in American Juvenile Courts." The manuscript 
was supported by Russell Sage grant number 
94 7042-55646; 
In re Gault was the Supreme Court's initial foray into 
what Mr. Justice Fortas called "a peculiar system for 
juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable con-
text" 1-the juvenile courts. With becoming modesty, the 
Court limited its inquiry to one ~ortion of juvenile pro-
ceedings, the adjudicatory stage, and passed on only 
certain aspects of that stage.3 Starting with the undis-
puted proposition that the due process clause has "a role 
to play"4 in evaluating the juvenile justice system, the 
Court saw the problem as one of ascertaining the "pre-
cise impact" of that requirement on the trial of delin-
quency cases.5 
Surely, no one doubts that the Gault decision was 
"constitutional" in nature. And Mr. Stapleton would be 
the first to point out that the Court could not have ren-
dered a "sociological" decision-if, indeed, such an ani-
mal exists. On the other hand, the Court did take ac-
count of certain social science materials6 in determining 
the "precise impact" of the due process clause on delin-
quency cases. And the importance of these materials and 
correlatively, of the way in which they were evaluated 
depends, in large part, on the exact principle upon which 
the Court based its decision. 
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For example, if the majority opinion rested on a politi-
cal judgement that any person, adult or child, is entitled 
to a particular set of procedures (presumably those re-
quired in criminal prosecutions) whenever official depri-
vation of liberty is threatened, then the social science 
evidence discussed in Gault has little real significance. 
Consequently, Mr. Stapleton's objections to the way in 
which this evidence was evaluated have only academic 
interest; the Court's decision would have been the same 
whatever the actual performance of the juvenile courts. 
And his proposed scheme for evaluating the juvenile 
justice system would be pointless, as well as almost cer-
tainly impermissible. 
However, no such political principle has yet been 
adopted by Gault or, for that matter, any other Supreme 
Court decision. The panoply of criminal protections is 
not required in many circumstances which may result in 
deprivation of liberty: for example, commitment pro-
ceedings on account of alleged mental disability ,7 civil 
contempt proceedings8 and proceedings in which the 
threatened deprivation is not considered "serious."9 
A narrower version of this same approach holds that, 
since the consequences of adjudication of delinquency 
and commitment to a state institution cannot meaning-
fully be distinguished from those of conviction and of 
imprisonment in the criminal process, the same body of 
protections should apply in each. In this view, social 
science info~mation might be valuable on the question of 
similarity or identity of consequences. Once those conse-
quences were ascertained and characterized, however, it 
would seem that social science would have little to con-
tribute-at least as far as adjudicative procedures are 
concerned. The various aspects of adversarial criminal 
trials would be carried over, in gross, to delinquency 
proceedings. 
While there is language in Gault which may lend sup-
port to such a reading, the conclusion that juvenile ad-
judication hearings are to be little criminal trials is not 
warranted by the decision as a whole. 10 In the first 
place, the majority concluded its rather broad discussion 
of the due process clause with this qualification: 
"'We do not mean ... to indicate that the hearing to be 
held must conform with all of the requirements of a 
criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; 
but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the 
essentials of due process and fair treatment.' "11 
Indeed, it expressly reserved the issues concerning the 
use of hearsay evidence, 12 the correct standard of 
proof, I 3 the right to a transcript 14 and the right to 
appeal from an adverse finding. 15 Moreover, the major-
ity explicitly rested its decision on considerations of due 
process rather than on the equal protection analysis 
offered by Mr. Justice Black.16 
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These factors, combined with the recognition that the 
juvenile justice system has some unique and advan-
tageous characteristics, suggest that, under Gault, crimi-
nal prosecutions should provide a point of reference 
rather than a model for delinquency proceedings. Such a 
reading falls somewhere between Mr. Justice Black's 
equal protection argument and the strict due process 
approach of Mr. Justice Harlan, who would have the 
Court, 
" ... determine what forms of procedural protections are 
necessary to guarantee the fundamental fairness of juve-
nile proceedings, and not which of the procedures now 
employed in criminal trials should be transplanted intact 
to proceedings in these specialized courts. "I 7 (emphasis 
added) 
The approach that the Court adopted in Gault and 
continued in In re Winship, I 8 then, is a species of what 
has been called (perhaps metaphorically) "selective in-
corporation."19 Certain aspects of criminal procedure 
are necessary to achieve accuracy, fairness and perhaps 
parity with the adult defendant. But others, at least in 
theory, must be held wholly or partially inappropriate to 
the peculiar requirements of the forum.20 (A case can 
be made, certainly, for Mr. Justice Harlan's view, not 
only on grounds of constitutional analysis but also on 
the ground that the criminal system is not so thoroughly 
satisfactory that it should be imposed by segments, 
warts and all, on the juvenile courts. This is not, how-
ever, the occasion for making that argument.) 
It appears that extending certain criminal due process 
safeguards to the juvenile defendant does not imply that 
the juvenile courts should be transformed into "little 
criminal courts"-even during the adjudicatory hearings. 
Mr. Stapleton's point, I take it, proceeds from the analo-
gous proposition that providing the right to counsel does 
not necessarily imply that attorneys in the juvenile 
courts should act as "little criminal lawyers." Certainly, 
there is a considerable body of ambiguous writing on the 
function of counsel in juvenile cases,21 and the con-
fusion it engenders is not relieved by the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics. Not only may the usefulness of the 
Canons depend on an original decision as to the nature 
of the proceedings, but identifying the client's "inter-
ests" in juvenile cases may pose substantial difficul-
ties. 2 2 Moreover, there are some areas of the law-such 
as matrimonia1 2 3 and tax24 law-in which counsel is 
said to owe a special duty to the court or to society. 
Arguably, the same concern for societal interests may be 
required of a juvenile court attorney. 
This reading of Gault clarifies Mr. Stapleton's thesis 
and the relevance of social science materials to the deci-
sion: if the attorney's role in juvenile cases has not al-
ready been defined by a political judgment of the sort 
reached in criminal prosecutions or by current rules of 
professional conduct, information relating to the social 
and professional consequences of role section may be 
considered.25 It is in this light, as Mr. Stapleton notes in 
some detail, that the Supreme Court used social science 
data in considering the consequences of traditional juve-
nile court practice and, to some degree, the institutional 
results its decision might occasion. But his point is that 
the Court's evaluation of this material was questionable 
in some respects and that a more systematic and careful 
analysis is desirable. Not at all coincidentally, he pro-
poses a method for such an analysis. 
As I understand it, Mr. Stapleton's idea is to divide 
delinquency cases of the sort under investigation into 
three groups. These groups are defined in terms of the 
attorney's role when the client has admitted involvement 
in the alleged offense. In one third of the cases, the ac-
cused may resist prosecution by the use of adversarial 
defense tactics. In another third, the lawyer is enjoined 
to admit the child's complicity. At this point, the attor-
ney may develop a dispositional scheme with an evalua-
tion team (or teams) and present it to the court. If the 
desired dispositional scheme is not available, the lawyer 
may and should take steps before the court, or the legis-
lature if necessary, to secure it for his client. In the last 
group, the lawyer plays no active role after entering an 
admission. 
The first of these schemes is con sis tent with the adver-
sarial defense posture contemplated by the criminal pro-
cess. The last is not unknown in traditional juvenile 
court practice. Taken with the second proposition, how-
ever, they suggest a new and challenging approach. 
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Despite the promise of Mr. Stapleton's proposition-
and even accepting the reading of Gault set out above-
lawyers (including myself) will have substantial reserva-
tions about joining the "experimenting society," at least 
in this context. Its major justification lies, of course, in 
the fact that it provides a design for assessing with some 
rigor the benefits of various approaches to juvenile de-
linquency. At the same time, it is perfectly clear that 
securing socially useful information, however desirable, 
is limited by other norms and, further, that there are 
instances in.which ideological or ethical norms control 
empirical ones. To take only one example, it may be 
important to know the exact tolerance of human bodies 
for cold. Surely the best way to determine this level is 
by freezing human bodies in carefully controlled stages, 
until the limit is reached in enough cases to permit one 
to draw a conclusion. Hopefully, it is clear that an ex-
.periment of this sort is forbidden by norms defining the 
place of the individual in society. 
Before endorsing Mr. Stapleton's plan, then, one must 
first be satisfied that no supervening value prohibits its 
implementation. It should be immediately apparent that 
a simple but very important proposition underlies the 
experimental program: it necessarily denies the admit-
tedly guilty child any right to resist societal intervention. 
One can hardly claim something as a right if its availa-
bility depends solely on random assignment rather than 
on something which inheres in the relationship of the 
person to the state. 
Much turns, therefore, on whether an admittedly 
guilty child can be said to have the right to resist official 
sanction despite his conceded culpability.26 Adopting 
the Gault approach, one might ask whether denying this 
right would be acceptable if the subject were an adult 
being tried in the criminal courts. The answer almost 
surely would be negative. The adversarial assumptions 
underlying the criminal justice system apparently permit 
the adult to resist official intervention even if the state 
staffs an institution with the appropriate experts and 
gives it a rehabilitative orien ta ti on. 2 7 
Mr. Stapleton's proposal obviously places considerable 
strain on an analysis-by-comparison of this sort. The 
criminal process assumes a diversity of interests between 
the state and the accused. This assumption is reflected in 
the idea that a "not guilty" plea does not necessarily 
serve a truth-telling function but says only that the de-
fendant is asserting his right to freedom until his guilt 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt-by lawful 
evidence and according to proper procedures. Of course, 
denial of this assumption has always been central to 
juvenile court philosophy and practice.28 Traditional 
juvenile court theory neither presumes nor recognizes an 
essential conflict between the interests of the state and 
those of the child. Nor did Gault address this point di-
rectly. To be sure, the Court did make clear that neither 
the doctrine of parens patriae nor "civil" rather than 
"criminal" characterization of the proceedings justifies 
the denial of those procedures necessary to fairness in 
the hearing of delinquency cases. Moreover, it can hardly 
be disputed that, to the extent that these rights are in-
voked, delinquency hearings will be more "adversarial" 
than before. However, it does not necessarily follow that 
providing procedures designed to ensure accuracy in fact-
finding, where the consequences of error are so great, 
implies a right to insist on such procedures where no real 
issue of fact exists-or, rather, where the existence of an 
issue of fact arises solely because a party is entitled to 
demand proof without having himself to deny the facts 
to be proved. 
There is, however, one feature of the Gault decision 
which may be read as indicating that delinquency cases 
are henceforth to be viewed as adversarial in the criminal 
sense. Mr. Justice F ortas, in discussing the applicability 
of the privilege against self-incrimination, takes some 
care to point out that the thrust of the privilege goes 
beyond concern for the accuracy of confessions, and 
that, 
"One of its purposes is to prevent the State, whether by 
force or by psychological domination, from overcoming 
the mind and will of the person under investigation and 
depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist 
the State in securing his conviction. "2 9 (emphasis added) 
Since this privilege applies as much to delinquency cases 
as to criminal prosecutions,30 it would seem to follow 
that the child has, as part of the freedom to decide 
whether to assist the state in securing his conviction, the 
option to sit back and force the state to its proof. 
It may be responded that the foregoing amounts to 
weaving a garment from a single thread-a thread that 
should not have been available in the first place. Perhaps 
there is some justification for such an objection, perhaps 
not. On the one hand, inadvertence in Supreme Court 
opinions, while not unknown, is not lightly to be as-
sumed. On the other hand, it would seem curious that 
resolution of so important an issue-one which not only 
89 
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affects the basic character of delinquency matters but 
carries obvious significance for other areas as well-
should be accomplished en passant, as it were. For the 
moment, it's enough to say that the principle that an 
accused should be allowed to put the state to its proof 
should be explicitly established as a general proposition 
before the criminal justice system can serve as a useful 
reference point for the juvenile courts. The tendency to 
forget that procedures follow rather than dictate norms 
should be resisted vigorously. 
It need hardly be added that the weakness of argu-
ment-by-comparison also extends to the observation that 
for some legal purposes, children may be subjected to 
special regulation. The political distance between the 
state and any individual varies according to, among other 
things, the nature and extent of official intervention. 
The important question is whether for purposes of this 
kind of action children can be wholly denied the right to 
oppose the state, at least where they have admitted guilt 
to counsel. 
There is not enough space here to fully develop the 
fundamental question raised by Mr. Stapleton's thesis, 
and it would be presumptuous to attempt a brief answer. 
In any event, it is not necessary to do so in order to con-
clude that his experiment is not now permissible. Such 
investigations must be consistent with fundamental po-
litical propositions which may or may not have been 
authoritatively established in the juvenile court area-
surely they have not yet been well considered. Consis-
tency cannot be supplied after experimentation has been 
concluded; to the extent that an adjustment of the 
boundary between individual and state is involved, that 
adjustment must be recognized and its propriety deter-
mined on its own merits. 
I. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967). The Court's earlier deci-
sion in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), was directed 
at the relinquishmerit, rather than exercise, of juvenile court 
jurisdiction, and an invitation to consider the constitutionality 
of adjudicative procedures was expressly declined. 383 U.S. at 
556. 
2. "We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these 
constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of 
the juvenile and the state. We do not even consider the entire 
process relating to juvenile 'delinquents' .... We consider only 
the problems presented to us by this case. These relate to the 
proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a 
juvenile is 'delinquent' ... with the consequence that he may be 
committed to a state institution." 387 U.S. at 13. 
3. See discussion at notes 13·15, infra. 
4. 387 U.S. at 13. 
5. Id. at 13-14. 
6. This is not the place to consider either the way in which 
information of this sort comes before the Court or the appro-
priateness of the "Brandeis Brief" when used to attack the con-
stitutionality of legislation. Suffice it to say that the Court's 
reference to information classifiable as "sociological" is hardly 
novel. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
particularly footnote 11, and the oral argument in its companion 
case, Briggs v. Elliott, partially reprinted in J. Maguire, J. Wein-
stein, J. Chadbourn & J. Mansfield, Cases and Materials on Evi-
dence 40-42 (5th ed. 1965). 
7. See generally, Lindman & Mcintyre, The Mentally Disabled 
and the Law (1961). For the relation between procedural re-
quirements and benefits promised but oft forgotten, see Sym-
posium: The Right to Treatment, 57 Geo. L. J. 675 (1969). 
8. E.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966). See 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342 (1970). 
9. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 151-52 
(1969) (distinction based on kind of deprivation of liberty); 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (distinction based on 
duration of deprivation of liberty). 
10. See Dorsen & Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juve-
nile Law, 1 Fam. L. Q. l (1967); Paulsen, The Constitutional 
Domestication of the Juvenile Court, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 233. 
II. 387 U.S. at 30. I Quoting from 383 U.S. at 562.) 
12. While the majority does hold that hearsay evidence cannot 
be the sole basis for a finding of delinquency, 387 U.S. I, 56, it 
is not clear that such evidence cannot be received at all. See Dor-
sen & Rezneck, supra note 13, at 3; Teitelbaum, The Use of So-
cial Reports in Juvenile Court Adjudications, 7 J. Fam. L. 425, 
431 (1967). 
13. 387 U.S. at 11-12. This issue has subsequently been decided 
in favor of requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in delin-
quency cases where institutionalization may result. In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 35 8 ( 1970). 
14. 387 U.S. at 58. 
15. Ibid. In addition, several issues relating to adjudication were 
not raised at all, including the applicability of the exclusionary 
rule to evidence (other than confessions) obtained illegally, the 
right to compulsory process to secure witnesses, the right to a 
public hearing and the right to trial by jury. The last of these is 
now before the Supreme Court in In re Burrus, No. 128 (Octo-
ber Term, 1970). 
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16. 387 U.S. at 61. 
17. Id. at 74. 
18. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). It can also be argued that the majority 
opinion has distinct equal protection overtones, despite its rejec-
tion of that basis for decision. The Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, for example, applies of its own force only to federal 
criminal prosecutions. See Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 
(1833). It applies in state prosecutions because it is considered 
fundamental to a fair trial and therefore is required by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372. U.S. 335 (1963). The process by which provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights are "selectively incorporated" into 
state proceedings is wi;ll known. In the juvenile court context, 
however, a second decision must be made: whether provisions of 
the Bill of Rights dealing with criminal prosecutions apply to 
matters which are not considered criminal by the state creating 
and holding such hearings. In Gault, this determination apparent-
ly was made by comparing the consequences of delinquency and 
criminal proceedings. The fact that similarities were found led 
the majority to require that certain criminal safeguards be pro-
vided in delinquency cases carrying the possibility of incarcera-
tion. This argument-by-comparison may be contrasted with Mr. 
Justice Harlan's classic due process approach, which considers 
whether any given procedure, in its context, offends basic no-
tions of justice and fairness. 
19. See Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note I 0, at I 0-1 I. 
20. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970), for evidence 
that the Court is concerned with adverse effects on certain as-
pects of the adjudication hearing, notably "informality, flexibil-
ity, (and I speed of the hearing," as well as for a discussion of 
what may be advantageous in pre-judicial and dispositional 
processes. 
21. For example, the Executive Director of the Philadelphia 
branch of the American Civil Liberties Union states that "the 
role of counsel should be basically the same as in criminal cases, 
namely, to present the defendant's situation in the best possible 
light at every stage of the proce~dings." But he hastens to add, 
"This does not imply that the lawyer will regard his [juvenile 
court] client the way he would regard an adult accused of crime, 
or that his technique in dealing with the child's case will be the 
same. A sensitive lawyer will recognize that his role is not neces-
sarily to help a kid beat the rap." Coxe, Lawyers in Juvenile 
Courts, 13 Crime & Delin. 488, 490 ( 1967). See Isaacs, The Role 
of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family Court, 
12 Buff. L. Rev. SOI (1963); Allison, The Lawyer and His Juve-
nile Court Client, 12 Crime & Delin. 165 ( 1966); Note, Rights 
and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 
281, 327 (1967), all suggesting ambiguities in counsel's role, but 
none pointing out specific situations in which counsel should, on 
his own, decide that some "right" should be relinquished. 
22. See Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-10, 
7-11 (1970): "The responsibilities of a lawyer may vary accord-
ing to the intelligence, experience, mental condition or age of a 
client ... or the nature of a particular proceeding .... Any men-
tal or physical condit!on of a client .that renders him incap'.l~le of 
making a considered Judgment on his own behalf casts add1t1onal 
responsibilities upon his lawyer." This comment is appended to 
the general canon entitled "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client 
Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law" and makes no particu-
lar reference to juvenile court matters. 
23. The lawyer in matrimonial cases, it has been suggested, 
"must always keep in mind the interest of society, and that his 
duty is not only to represent any party engaged by him, but also 
the State." Peeples, Lawyers and Divorce, 19 Tenn. L. Rev. 930, 
936 (1947). See Harper & Harper, Lawyers and Marriage Coun-
seling, 1 J. Fam. L. 73, 80-81 (1961). 
24. It is frequently said that tax counsel owes a dual responsibil-
ity: "he must be loyal to his client, but he is also bound to the 
Government to see that his client does not avoid his just share of 
the tax burden except by positive command of the law .... " 
Paul, The Lawyer as Tax Adviser, 25 Rcky Mtn. L. Rev. 412, 
422 ( 1953). See Hellerstein, Ethical Problems in Office Counsel-
ing, 8 Tax L. Rev. 4 (1952); Tarleau, Ethical Problems in Dealing 
with Treasury Representatives, 8 Tax L. Rev. 10, 13 (1952). 
2 5. The professional consequences of role definition involve the 
extent to which a lawyer is made to either function as an adver-
sary in a nonadversarial setting or to adopt a judgmental role for 
which he is ill equipped by training and, perhaps, by inclination. 
The social consequences of role definition may involve, for ex-
ample, the freeing-without treatment that may be much ·needed. 
and with what may be considerable risk to the community-of a 
client who has committed a serious breach of law. According to 
Mr. Stapleton's data, the latter risk cannot be dismissed as negli-
gible. One would expect his data to understate, if anything, the 
incidence of dismissal of guilty children, since there are probably 
more guilty children who do not admit to their attorneys than 
there are not-guilty children who do admit. 
2 6. It is sometimes said that a lawyer can never really know 
whether his client is guilty, even when a confidential confession 
is supported by corroborative evidence. For purposes of this 
discussion, it is enough to assume that an attorney can, and 
sometimes does, know that his client is guilty to the extent that 
anyone can have knowledge of another man's guilt. See J. Dos 
Passos, The American Lawyer 158-59 ( 1907). Whether the resi-
due of error should have institutional significance is a question 
better reserved for full discussion. 
27. As the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the 
Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (1963) observed, 
"American criminal procedure is accusatorial in nature and 
founded upon the adversary system." Report of the Attorney 
General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Fed-
eral Criminal Justice 11 ( 1963). The essence of this system is 
challenge; it presupposes "a constant, searching and creative 
questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority at all 
stages of the process"-and not cooperation or accession to gov-
ernmental demands. Ibid. In resolving the conflicting interests of 
state and individual, procedure may be as important as outcome. 
See Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, I I J. 
Confl. Res. 52 (1967). 
91 
6
Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 1 [1971], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol1/iss2/9
92 
28. See State v. Scholl, I 67 Wis. S04, 167 N .W. 830 ( 1918);_ 
Lindsey, Colorado's Contribution to the Juvenile Court, in The 
Child, The Clinic and The Court 274 (J. Addams, ed. 1927); 
Mack, The Chancery Procedures in the Juvenile Court, id. at 31 I; 
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1-909). As Mr. 
Stapleton argues, juvenile courts do have features designed to 
afford juvenile respondents a measure of protection not available 
to adults defendants. To some extent, these features reflect legis-
lative implementation of a non-punitive philosophy. Conviction 
for crime, to take one example, is clearly condemnatory and is 
intended to be so. See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 2 3 
Law & Conte mp. Prob. 40 I, 404-0S (I 9S8). Adjudication of 
delinquency is probably not intended to carry such moral con-
tent, as shown by the fact that it does not carry the same formal 
consequences as conviction of crime. See Gough, The Expunge-
ment of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: 
A Problem of Statlls, 1966 Wash. U. L. Q. 14 7, I 68 et seq., for 
discussion and collection of authorities. This is not to say that an 
adjudication of delinquency does not involve adverse conse-
quences for the respondent, for indeed it does; it is only to say 
that the nature and consequences of delinquency proceedings 
cannot be ascertained simply by characterizing them as "the 
same as in criminal prosecutions." 
29. 387 U.S. at 47. 
30. Id. at SS. 
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